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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
In 1996, after years of negotiation, a Joint Venture 
Agreement ("the Agreement") was entered into between 
DuPont China ("DPC"), Rhone Poulenc Fiber and Resin 
Intermediates ("Rhodia Fiber"), and Liaoyang Petro- 
Chemical Fiber Company ("LYPFC"), a Chinese entity. DPC 
and Rhodia Fiber are subsidiaries of E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours and Company ("DuPont") and Rhodia, SA  
("Rhodia"),1 respectively. The object of the 50-year joint 
venture was to create Sanlong Nylon Company Limited 
("Sanlong") to research, manufacture, and sell certain 
fibers. The joint venture ultimately failed and DuPont, the 
parent of DPC, brought suit against Rhodia Fiber and its 
parent, Rhodia, to recover, DuPont says, not for breach of 
the Agreement, to which it was not a party, but rather for 
breach of an oral agreement and fraudulent 
misrepresentations which occurred much later in time and 
as a result of which it was damaged. Rhodia Fiber and 
Rhodia moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds 
and to compel arbitration. The District Court denied that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Formerly known as Rhone Poulenc, Fibres Et Polymeres S.A. 
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motion in all respects, and an appeal was taken from the 
denial of the motion to compel arbitration and the denial of 
the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We 
will affirm as to the former and dismiss the appeal as to the 
latter. 
 
I. The Joint Venture Agreement 
 
While DuPont does not purport to have sued on the 
Agreement itself, there is no dispute that the Agreement 
was at the heart of the proceedings before the District 
Court and is at the heart of this appeal. We begin, 
therefore, with the relevant provisions of the Agreement and 
the background of how this litigation came to be. 
 
Each party to the Agreement -- DPC, Rhodia Fiber and 
LYPFC -- was to contribute significant capital to the joint 
venture in relation to its interest in the venture. In P 7.02, 
the parties agreed that: 
 
       (a) The Company [Sanlong] will be responsible for 
       obtaining financing that is beyond or in addition to the 
       Company's registered capital by borrowing funds from 
       sources inside China or outside China. Upon the 
       unanimous affirmative vote of every director of the 
       Board, each Party shall provide guaranties[sic] for 
       such additional financing, in proportion to the Party's 
       contribution to registered capital. A Party may 
       guarantee the Company's local currency or foreign 
       currency borrowings, provided that the aggregate 
       amount of all guaranties [sic] provided, by each Party 
       is in proportion to that Party's contribution to 
       registered capital. If any Party's guaranty is not 
       acceptable to the Lender, that Party shall, subject to 
       any necessary approval of the relevant authorities, 
       arrange a guaranty from a financial institution or other 
       company acceptable to the lender. 
 
       (B) Upon the unanimous affirmative vote of every 
       director of the Board in support of the Company 
       obtaining additional financing by way of borrowing 
       from the Parties, each Party shall directly or indirectly 
       provide loans for additional financing, in proportion to 
       the Party's contribution to registered capital. The terms 
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       and duration of such loans shall be equitable among 
       the Parties and agreed upon by the Board. 
 
P 7.02 (emphasis added). Nothing in this paragraph 
obligated either parent company -- DuPont or Rhodia -- to 
provide any guarantees or loans; rather, guarantees and/or 
loans were obligations of the subsidiaries. 
 
Even though the parent companies were not parties to 
the Agreement, it was stated in the Agreement that they 
would "assist the Company in the balancing of foreign 
exchange during the Company's initial years of operation by 
exporting 14,000 tons and 6,000 tons per year of nylon 6,6 
polymer flake respectively in accordance to the DuPont 
Polymer Flake Export Sales Agreement and RP Polymer 
Flake Export Sales Agreement respectively." P 10.01(b). 
Also, to ensure the success of the Company, the Agreement 
provided that the parties "and their Affiliates will not take 
action detrimental to the interest or well-being of the 
Company." P 10.03(a).2 In conjunction with the Agreement, 
DuPont (the parent) entered into three related agreements 
with the joint venture company: a supply agreement, a 
license contract and an export sales agreement. Rhodia (the 




2. The Agreement defined "Affiliate," "Affiliates" or "Affiliated Company" 
as 
 
       "any corporation, partnership, association, or other entity or 
       organization which controls, or is controlled by, or is under 
common 
       control with, that Party. The term "control" as used with respect 
to 
       any Party, means the ownership, directly or indirectly of 50% or 
       more of the voting stock of such corporation or the possession, 
       directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the 
direction of 
       the management and policies of such corporation, partnership, 
       association or other entity or organization, or to receive, 
directly or 
       indirectly, 50% or more of the profits of such corporation, 
       partnership, association or other entity or organization (whether 
       through the ownership or voting stock, by contracts or otherwise). 
       Notwithstanding the foregoing for purposes of this Contract, 
       "Affiliate" "Affiliates" or Affiliated Company" shall not mean 
China 
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Two provisions of the Agreement are of particular 
relevance and, thus, particular importance here. First, the 
Agreement contained an arbitration clause: 
 
       In the event any dispute or claim or difference of any 
       kind whatsoever arises in connection with the 
       interpretation or implementation of this Contract  (a 
       "dispute"), including any question regarding its 
       existence[,] validity or termination, the parties shall 
       attempt in the first instance to resolve the dispute 
       through friendly consultations. If the dispute is not 
       resolved in this manner within sixty (60) days after one 
       Party has given both the other Parties written notice of 
       the existence of the dispute, then, the dispute shall be 
       referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in 
       Singapore in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of 
       the Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SAIC") 
       for the time being in force. The tribunal shall consist of 
       three (3) arbitrators. The governing law of this 
       arbitration shall be the substantive law of the PRC and 
       the language of arbitration shall be English. 
 
P 25.01 (emphasis added). Second, the Agreement provided 
that it was 
 
       . . . made for the benefit of LYPFC, [Rhodia Fiber], DCH 
       and their respective lawful successors and assignees 
       and is legally binding on them. This Contract may not 
       be changed orally, but only by a written instrument 
       signed by LYPFC, [Rhodia Fiber] and DCH and 




After the joint venture failed, DuPont filed a three count 
Complaint against Rhodia Fiber and Rhodia. In the first 
count, entitled "Third Party Beneficiary Claims," DuPont 
alleged that "DuPont, as the ultimate parent of DCH and as 
the party required to provide loan guaranties [sic] on behalf 
of its subsidiary DCH, was an intended party beneficiary of 
the Joint Venture Contract," and that "Rhodia Fiber 
materially breached the Joint Venture Contract by, without 
limitation, failing to provide or secure the required loan 
guaranties [sic]." A80-81. In the second count, entitled 
"Breach of Agreement to Secure and Provide 
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Guaranties/Promissory Estoppel," DuPont alleged that it 
was harmed by the breach by Rhodia Fiber and Rhodia of 
a January 1998 oral agreement between DuPont and the 
two defendants pursuant to which the defendants agreed 
to support the joint venture but did not thereafter 
provide or secure the requisite loan guarantees. In the 
third count, entitled "Fraudulent Inducement/Material 
Misrepresentation," DuPont alleged that Rhodia Fiber and 
Rhodia made false statements of fact to DuPont with the 
intent to induce DuPont's subsidiary DCH "to commit 
substantial resources and investments to the business of 
the Joint Venture and to induce DuPont to support the 
business of the Joint Venture by, inter alia, providing Loan 
guaranties on behalf of the Joint Venture." A83. 
 
In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration 
and to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
insufficient service of process, failure to join an 
indispensable party, and forum non conveniens. DuPont 
then filed a First Amended Complaint significantly altering 
its theory of liability. For starters, DuPont dropped the first 
count of the Complaint, which alleged a breach of the 
Agreement to which it was an intended third party 
beneficiary. The first count of the Amended Complaint, 
entitled "Breach of Agreement to Secure and Provide 
Guaranties/Promissory Estoppel," instead mimicked the 
second count of the Complaint, i.e., alleging that at a 
meeting on January 22, 1998, Bruno deSoyres on behalf of 
Rhodia, the parent, and Rhodia Fiber, the subsidiary, 
entered into an oral agreement with DuPont to further 
support the joint venture by securing and providing loan 
guarantees, and abide by the obligations contemplated by 
the Agreement. According to the Amended Complaint, 
 
        22. During discussions regarding the EPC Contr acts, 
       representatives of RP expressed concerns regarding the 
       Joint Venture which led DuPont representatives to 
       believe that the RP Group was reluctant to perform 
       obligations arising from the Joint Venture Agreement. 
       DCH, as the party to the Joint Venture Contract, and 
       DuPont as the ultimate parent of DCH and the party 
       providing the Loan guaranties required to finance the 
       EPC Contracts, desired to confirm the commitment of 
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       the Rhodia Group to the venture before executing of 
       the EPC contracts and incurring the further financial 
       liabilities associated therewith. 
 
        23. At the request of the Rhodia Group's deSoy res, 
       representatives of DCH and DuPont convened a 
       meeting with deSoyres in Wilmington, Delaware, on 
       January 22, 1998. Kenneth Wall represented DuPont 
       and Michael Estep represented DCH at this meeting. 
       deSoyres represented the interests of the Rhodia 
       Group. 
 
        24. During the meeting, DuPont and DCH receive d 
       assurance that the Rhodia Group would continue to 
       support the Joint Venture and fully perform all the 
       obligations contemplated by the Joint Venture Contract 
       as long as DuPont and DCH did. DCH and DuPont 
       accepted and relied upon these assurances in 
       proceeding with the Joint Venture, approving execution 
       of the EPC Contracts and in agreeing to and ultimately 
       providing Loan guaranties pursuant to the Joint 




DuPont alleged that the "Rhodia Group" breached this 
oral agreement, and, thus, DuPont named both the parent 
and the subsidiary in this count as well as the two 
remaining counts. The second count of the Amended 
Complaint mimicked the third count of the Complaint, i.e., 
alleging that at the January 1998 meeting the "Rhodia 
Group" made false statements regarding its intent to 
support the joint venture and induced DuPont by material 
misrepresentations to further support the joint venture. 
Finally, the third count of the Amended Complaint alleged 
"Negligent Misrepresentation" based upon the same 
statements underlying the new second count. 
 
As noted above, the District Court denied defendants' 
motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration, 
and they appealed. We turn to the issues we are called 
upon to decide. 
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A. Should Arbitration Have Been Compelled as to a 
       Non-Signatory? 
 
The thrust of this appeal is whether the District Court 
erred in its refusal to compel arbitration.3 There is no 
dispute that the Agreement contained a valid and 
enforceable arbitration clause which required all disputes 
arising out of the Agreement between the parties be 
submitted to binding arbitration in Singapore. The only 
question is whether DuPont, a non-signatory to that 
Agreement, is bound by that arbitration clause. Similarly, 
there is no dispute that a non-signatory cannot be bound 
to arbitrate unless it is bound "under traditional principles 
of contract and agency law" to be akin to a signatory of the 
underlying agreement. Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemsite (Pty) 
Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999). Appellants appeal 
from the District Court's conclusion that DuPont was not 
bound to arbitrate because it was not (a) an intended third 
party beneficiary of the Agreement, (b) the disclosed 
principal of its agent, DPC, a party to the Agreement, or (c) 
equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration. We review the 
District Court's conclusions de novo. Pritzker v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1113 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 
As we recently held: 
 
       The FAA establishes a strong federal policy in favor of 
       compelling arbitration over litigation. The Act provides 
       that if a party petitions to enforce an arbitration 
       agreement, "[t]he court shall hear the parties, and 
       upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement 
       for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not 
       in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
       parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the 
       terms of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. S 4. The presumption 
       in favor of arbitration carries "special force" when 
       international commerce is involved, because the United 
       States is also a signatory to the Convention on the 
       Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the denial of 
a motion to compel arbitration. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l. Corp., 220 
F.3d 99, 102-04 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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       Awards. The CREFAA commits the courts of signatory 
       states to refer parties to arbitration when the parties 
       have agreed to arbitrate disputes. CREFAA is enforced 
       in the United States under Chapter Two of the FAA. 
 
Sandvik AB v. Advent International Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 104- 
05 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The liberal 
policy "favoring arbitration agreements . . . is at bottom a 
policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual 
arrangements," id., and under the FAA,"a court may only 
compel a party to arbitrate where that party has entered 
into a written agreement to arbitrate that covers the 
dispute. Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (PTY) Ltd., 181 F.3d 
435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Arbitration is strictly a matter of 
contract. If a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts 
have no authority to mandate that he do so."). 
 
Because arbitration is a creature of contract law, when 
asked to enforce an arbitration agreement against a non- 
signatory to an arbitration clause, we ask "whether he or 
she is bound by that agreement under traditional principles 
of contract and agency law." Id. at 444. Each of appellants' 
theories for binding DuPont to the arbitration clause, i.e., 
third party beneficiary, agency/principal, and equitable 
estoppel, is a recognized principle of contract or agency law 
applicable in the arbitration context. See Thompson-CSF, 
S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (listing ways in which non-signatories have been 
bound to arbitration clauses); see also Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. 
Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1294-96 (3d Cir. 1996) (non- 
signatories could not enforce arbitration clause against 
signatory where no exception applied, but successor to 
signatory could compel arbitration); Barrowclough v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985)(compelling 
signatory-employee to arbitrate claims against signatory- 
employer and non-objecting related non-signatory), 
overruled on other grounds by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993). We 
consider them in turn. 
 
       1. Was DuPont a Third Party Beneficiary? 
 
Appellants maintain that DuPont was an intended third 
party beneficiary of the Agreement and, thus, DuPont is 
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bound by the arbitration clause. The District Court held 
that DuPont was not a third party beneficiary and, even if 
it were, because the claims asserted by DuPont do not arise 
from any "third party beneficiary" status under the 
Agreement, DuPont was not bound to arbitrate its claims as 
a third party beneficiary. The District Court was correct. 
 
In a series of cases, courts have allowed non-signatory 
third party beneficiaries to compel arbitration against 
signatories of arbitration agreements. John Hancock Life 
Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48, 59-61 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(member of NASD which was bound by its membership to 
arbitrate disputes, was properly compelled to arbitrate by 
third party beneficiary of that agreement); Spear, Leeds & 
Kellogg v. Central Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21, 29-30 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (same with respect to NYSE rules). In the reverse 
situation, we have also bound a non-signatory third party 
beneficiary to a forum selection clause in the underlying 
contract. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 
709 F.2d 190, 202-04 (3d Cir. 1983), overruled on other 
grounds by Lauro Lines v. Chasses, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). 
Thus, whether seeking to avoid or compel arbitration, a 
third party beneficiary has been bound by contract terms 
where its claim arises out of the underlying contract to 
which it was an intended third party beneficiary. 
 
Appellants rely heavily on Coastal Steel in attempting to 
show that DuPont was as an intended third party 
beneficiary. In that case, a New Jersey company, Coastal 
Steel, entered into a contract with Farmer Norton which 
contained an arbitration clause. To fulfill that contract, and 
at Coastal's suggestion, Farmer Norton contracted with 
Tilghman for the purchase of a blast unit. The contract 
between Farmer Norton and Tilghman contained a forum 
selection clause which named England as the forum. While 
in bankruptcy, Coastal filed suit against, inter alia, Farmer 
Norton (also bankrupt), Tilghman, and its American parent 
alleging breach arising out of the Farmer Norton-Tilghman 
contract. The Bankruptcy Court and District Court denied 
Tilghman's motion to dismiss in favor of the forum selection 
clause contained in the Farmer Norton-Tilghman contract. 
We reversed, and held that Coastal, a non-signatory to the 
Farmer Norton-Tilghman contract, was a third party 
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beneficiary of that contract and, thus, was bound by the 
forum selection clause contained therein. Coastal Steel, 709 
F.2d at 202-04. We reasoned that carving out an exception 
to the enforcement of forum selection clauses against third 
party beneficiaries would be "inconsistent with the law of 
contracts, which has long recognized that third-party 
beneficiary status does not permit the avoidance of 
contractual provisions otherwise enforceable." Id. at 203. 
By doing business with Farmer Norton knowing that 
Farmer Norton would, in turn, contract with Tilghman in 
order to fulfill the underlying contract with Coastal, Coastal 
was an intended third party beneficiary of the Farmer 
Norton-Tilghman contract and could not avoid the forum 
selection clause when it sued for breach of that contract. 
Id. 
 
Appellants argue that DuPont, "whose employees 
negotiated this contract, has admitted that it was obligated 
to make a loan guarantee on behalf of DuPont China and 
that it was the intended beneficiary of the contract which 
allegedly required Rhodia Fiber to provide a similar 
guarantee." Appellants' Br. at 40. This argument is flawed 
for at least two reasons. First, unlike the clear third party 
beneficiary relationship in Coastal, there is no evidence that 
DuPont was an intended third party beneficiary under the 
Agreement. Under Delaware law, which is the law the 
parties discuss, to qualify as a third party beneficiary of a 
contract, (a) the contracting parties must have intended 
that the third party beneficiary benefit from the contract, 
(b) the benefit must have been intended as a gift or in 
satisfaction of a pre-existing obligation to that person, and 
(c) the intent to benefit the third party must be a material 
part of the parties' purpose in entering into the contract. 
Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc. , 583 
A.2d 1378, 1386 (1990) ("In order for third-party 
beneficiary rights to be created, not only is it necessary that 
performance of the contract confer a benefit upon a third 
person that was intended, but the conferring of the 
beneficial effect on such third-party, whether it be creditor 
or donee, should be a material part of the contract's 
purpose."). Thus, if it was not the promisee's intention to 
confer direct benefits upon a third party, but rather such 
third party happens to benefit from the performance of the 
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promise either coincidentally or indirectly, then the third 
party will have no enforceable rights under the contract. 
Appellants have not offered any evidence that DuPont was 
anything more than an incidental third party beneficiary. 
 
The parties to the Agreement were only LYPFC (the 
Chinese entity), Rhodia Fiber and DCH; moreover, the 
Agreement provided that it was 
 
       made for the benefit of LYPFC, [Rhodia Fiber], DCH 
       and their respective lawful successors and assignees 
       and is legally binding on them. This Contract may not 
       be changed orally, but only by a written instrument 
       signed by LYPFC, [Rhodia Fiber] and DCH and 
       approved by the Examination and Approval Authority. 
 
A158, P 27.03. The arbitration clause itself anticipated only 
three beneficiaries to the Agreement, all of them parties. It 
stated that if disputes could not be resolved amicably and 
"one Party has given both of the other Parties written notice 
of the existence of the dispute, then, the dispute shall be 
referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in Singapore 
in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre ("SAIC") for the time being 
in force." P 25.01 (emphasis added). Although DuPont as 
the parent of DPC would certainly benefit from the success 
of DPC, DuPont was not an intended third party beneficiary 
of the Agreement any more than any parent who expects to 
benefit from the success of the business ventures of its 
subsidiary. 
 
Appellants argue, however, that DuPont was a third party 
beneficiary because (a) DuPont negotiated the Agreement, 
(b) DuPont's claims "mirror DuPont China's claims in 
arbitration, all of which stem from the Joint Venture 
Contract," (c) DuPont was positioned to derive more than 
shareholder benefits from the joint venture, and (d) DuPont 
claimed in the initial Complaint that it was a third party 
beneficiary of the Agreement and that it was required to 
guarantee the joint venture company's debt under the 
Agreement. We disagree. 
 
First, that DuPont negotiated the Agreement, without 
more, has nothing to do with whether it was a third party 
beneficiary. Second, appellants err in their contention that 
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DuPont's claims mirror DPC's claims in arbitration. DPC is 
arbitrating the breach of the underlying Agreement and 
seeking its lost profits and the recoupment of its investment 
whereas DuPont is litigating its losses arising out of a 1998 
oral agreement that was breached and misrepresentations 
made by appellants' representative outside of the Agreement.4 
Third, appellants have offered nothing to support their bald 
assertion that DuPont was positioned to derive more than 
shareholder benefits from the joint venture. While DuPont's 
"related agreements" at least potentially would have 
benefitted DuPont, they do not render DuPont an intended 
third party beneficiary of the Agreement. Fourth, although 
it was imprudent of DuPont to have alleged in its initial 
Complaint that it was a third party beneficiary of the 
Agreement, the question of its status is ultimately for us to 
decide under applicable law. Parenthetically, we note that it 
was also imprudent for DuPont to allege, as it initially 
alleged, that it was required under the Agreement to 
guarantee the joint venture's debt. DuPont now states, 
correctly, that under the Agreement, DPC was required to 
provide a suitable guarantee and that, DuPont, in turn, 
chose to provide that guarantee for DPC. 
 
Appellants' third party beneficiary argument fails for yet 
another, perhaps more obvious, reason. Appellants point 
out that "[t]he Court in Coastal Steel  applied the forum 
selection clause to all claims that implicated the underlying 
contract to which Coastal Steel was third-party beneficiary, 
including claims for negligent design, breach of implied 
warranty and misrepresentation." Appellants' Br. at 37. 
Coastal Steel, its progeny and Delaware law make clear that 
a third party beneficiary will only be bound by the terms of 
the underlying contract where the claims asserted by that 
beneficiary arise from its third party beneficiary status. 
Industrial Electronics Corp. v. iPower Distribution Group, 
Inc., 215 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2000) (third party 
beneficiary non-signatory was not compelled to arbitrate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. DPC alleged in the arbitration that Rhodia Fiber failed to provide the 
required guarantee under Article 7.02 for a proposed loan to Sanlong, 
causing the loan not to be made and, thus, causing Sanlong's collapse 
and dissolution. At oral argument, we were advised that Rhodia Fiber 
lost the arbitration but that damages had not yet been set. 
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claims because the claims did not arise out of the contract 
from which it derived its third party status); Spear, 85 F.3d 
at 29-30. None of DuPont's amended claims, however, arise 
out of its alleged third party beneficiary status under the 
Agreement; rather, DuPont's claims arise from the 
misrepresentations allegedly made to it by appellants' 
representative. Those misrepresentations, while arguably 
related to the underlying Agreement, do not relate to any 
"third party beneficiary" status created at the inception of 
the Agreement.5 
 
       2. Agency 
 
Next, appellants argue that DuPont's intimate 
involvement with the Sanlong project renders it liable under 
traditional agency principles because DPC acted as 
DuPont's disclosed agent and, under principles of agency 
law, DuPont is bound by DPC's Agreement. The District 
Court correctly rejected this argument, a conclusion 
underscored by the fact that appellants have failed to cite 
either the relevant factors we should consider in 
determining whether DCH acted as DuPont's agent or any 
case that would carry the day. 
 
Traditional principles of agency law may bind a non- 
signatory to an arbitration agreement. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. 
American Arbitration Assoc., 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 
1995). Under Delaware law: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Even if this Court were to find that DuPont is bound by the Agreement 
and, thus, by the arbitration clause, DuPont might well argue that its 
claims fall outside the scope of that clause. The arbitration clause 
applies only to a dispute that "arises in connection with the 
interpretation or implementation of this Contract." A156, P 25.01. Even 
though the "arising out of " language has been read broadly by courts, 
DuPont could argue that its claims in the Amended Complaint arise out 
of alleged obligations or misrepresentations made outside of the 
Agreement and not arising therefrom. See Industrial Electronics, 215 F.3d 
at 680 (third party beneficiary non-signatory was not compelled to 
arbitrate claims because the claims did not arise out of the contract from 
which it derived its third party status.). Thus, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that, were this Court to find DuPont bound by the 
Agreement, this case would automatically be sent to arbitration. 
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       One corporation whose shares are owned by a second 
       corporation does not, by that fact alone, become the 
       agent of the second company. However, one 
       corporation -- completely independent of a second 
       corporation -- may assume the role of the second 
       corporation's agent in the course of one or more 
       specific transactions. This restricted agency 
       relationship may develop whether the two separate 
       corporations are parent and subsidiary or are 
       completely unrelated outside the limited agency 
       setting. Under this second theory, total domination or 
       general alter ego criteria need not be proven. 
 
        When one corporation acts as the agent of a 
       disclosed principal corporation, the latter corporation 
       may be liable on contracts made by the agent. Liability 
       may attach to the principal corporation even though it 
       is not a party named in the agreement. 
 
        Unlike the alter ego/piercing the corporate veil 
       theory, when customary agency is alleged the 
       proponent must demonstrate a relationship between 
       the corporation and the cause of action. Not only must 
       an arrangement exist between the two corporations so 
       that one acts on behalf of the other and within usual 
       agency principles, but the arrangement must be 
       relevant to the plaintiff 's claim of wrongdoing. 
 
Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1466, 
1477 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). To bind a principal 
by its agent's acts, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
agent was acting on behalf of the principal and that the 
cause of action arises out of that relationship. Id. 
 
Appellants rely principally on J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. 
Rhone Poulenc Textiles, S.A., 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988) 
and Phoenix Canada in support of their agency argument. 
In Phoenix Canada, we did not apply agency principles but, 
instead, remanded for the District Court to make this fact- 
intensive inquiry. Moreover, we noted that the agency 
relationship must relate to the cause of action alleged in 
the complaint. It is far from clear that this case passes that 
test. Appellants' reliance on J.J. Ryan & Sons  is also 
misplaced. The Fourth Circuit never cited to agency 
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principles and merely permitted a signatory to arbitrate its 
claims against a non-signatory parent company where that 
parent company was willing to submit to arbitration. J.J. 
Ryan & Sons, 863 F.2d at 320-21. The Court noted, 
however, held that a court "may" refer claims against a 
non-signatory parent to arbitration when the claims against 
the parent and the subsidiary are "based on the same facts 
and are inherently inseparable." Id. at 320. No such claim 
can be made here. 
 
Appellants also invoke Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993), but 
Pritzker is inapposite. In Pritzker, we bound an agent to the 
principal's arbitration agreement. Here, appellants seek to 
hold a principal to an agent's agreement and the rationale 
of Pritzker does not apply with equal force. In Pritzker, a 
trustee of a pension plan sued its broker, Merrill Lynch, 
and a related company to recover for violations of ERISA. 
Merrill Lynch moved to compel arbitration and the District 
Court denied that motion. We reversed, holding that (a) the 
trustees were bound to arbitrate their claims against Merrill 
Lynch as signatories to a binding arbitration agreement, 
and (b) over the trustees' objection, the trustees were 
bound to arbitrate the dispute against the individual broker 
and the sister company, neither of which signed the 
aforementioned agreement. Specifically, with respect to the 
broker, we found that where the principal is bound to 
arbitration and the complaints arise out of the agent's 
conduct on behalf of that principal, the agent is bound by 
the principal's agreement to arbitrate disputes. Id. at 1122. 
With respect to the sister company, we summarily found 
that company bound as an agent and possibly as an alter- 
ego of Merrill Lynch. Id. 
 
In the case sub judice, unlike Pritzker , appellants seek to 
hold DuPont liable as a principal, not as an agent; 
moreover, unlike Pritzker, DuPont could act on its own. 
 
Appellants' attempt to bind DuPont on agency principles 
fails. 
 
       3. Equitable Estoppel 
 
Finally, appellants argue that DuPont is equitably 
estopped from avoiding the arbitration clause in the 
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Agreement. We have never applied an equitable estoppel 
theory to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration clause 
although there appears to be no reason why, in an 
appropriate case, we would refrain from doing so. 
 
As the Second Circuit recently explained, there are two 
theories of equitable estoppel in this context. First, courts 
have held non-signatories to an arbitration clause when the 
non-signatory knowingly exploits the agreement containing 
the arbitration clause despite having never signed the 
agreement. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration 
Assoc., 64 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, courts 
have bound a signatory to arbitrate with a non-signatory 
"at the nonsignatory's insistence because of`the close 
relationship between the entities involved, as well as the 
relationship of the alleged wrongs to the nonsignatory's 
obligations and duties in the contract . . . and[the fact 
that] the claims were intimately founded in and intertwined 
with the underlying contract obligations.' " Id. at 779 
(quoting Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 
10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir. 1993)(quoting McBro Planning 
& Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 
(7th Cir. 1984))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Appellants' reliance on the first of these two theories stands 
on somewhat stronger ground than their reliance on the 
second. 
 
Under the first theory, courts prevent a non-signatory 
from embracing a contract, and then turning its back on 
the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, 
that it finds distasteful. See, e.g., American Bureau of 
Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (non-signatory bound by contract under which it 
received the direct benefits of lower insurance and the 
ability to sail under the French flag); Thomson-CSF, S.A., 64 
F.3d at 779 (finding only indirect benefit insufficient to 
invoke equitable estoppel against a non-signatory). As the 
Fourth Circuit explained, "In the arbitration context, the 
doctrine recognizes that a party may be estopped from 
asserting that the lack of his signature on a written 
contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration 
clause when he has consistently maintained that other 
provisions of the same contract should be enforced to 
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benefit him. `To allow [a plaintiff] to claim the benefit of the 
contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens would both 
disregard equity and contravene the purposes underlying 
enactment of the Arbitration Act.' " International Paper Co. 
v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 
411, 418 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). 
 
Generally, these cases involve non-signatories who, 
during the life of the contract, have embraced the contract 
despite their non-signatory status but then, during 
litigation, attempt to repudiate the arbitration clause in the 
contract. See, e.g., Tencara Shipyard, 170 F.3d at 353 (non- 
signatory derived benefit from contract and could not avoid 
the arbitration clause contained therein).6 Here, there is no 
evidence that DuPont embraced the Agreement itself during 
the lifetime of the Agreement, or that it received any direct 
benefit under the Agreement. Thus, in a strict sense, these 
cases do not help appellants.7 
 
What gives us some pause, however, is that a close 
examination of the Amended Complaint reveals that, at 
bottom, DuPont's claims against the subsidiary, Rhodia 
Fiber, arise, at least in part, from the underlying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. At least one court has referred to "equitable estoppel" when it 
required 
a non-signatory to arbitrate based on its conduct during litigation as 
opposed to during the lifetime of the commercial contract. International 
Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 417-18 (buyer was bound to arbitrate claim 
against manufacturer even though it was not a signatory to 
manufacturer-distributor contract because the buyer alleged a breach of 
that contract). While at first blush this appears helpful to appellants, a 
closer examination reveals that the non-signatory in that case also 
received a direct benefit under the contract during the lifetime of the 
contract. 
 
7. We cannot help but note that many of these cases resemble the third 
party beneficiary cases. In Tencara Shipyard, for example, the non- 
signatory was the intended third party beneficiary of the contract 
containing the arbitration clause. The two theories of liability are, 
however, distinct. Under the third party beneficiary theory, a court must 
look to the intentions of the parties at the time the contract was 
executed. Under the equitable estoppel theory, a court looks to the 
parties' conduct after the contract was executed. Thus, the snapshot this 
Court examines under equitable estoppel is much later in time than the 
snapshot for third party beneficiary analysis. 
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Agreement. Parenthetically, it is difficult to decipher exactly 
what DuPont claims each appellant has done giving rise to 
liability because in its Amended Complaint DuPont lumps 
them together as "the Rhodia Group," just as in the 
Complaint, it lumped them together as "RP." 
 
The Amended Complaint does not allege only that 
Rhodia, the parent, breached its oral agreement to provide 
loan guarantees to its subsidiary. If this were DuPont's only 
claim in this case, the Amended Complaint would have 
named one, and only one, defendant -- Rhodia. Instead, the 
Amended Complaint also named Rhodia Fiber, the 
subsidiary, as a defendant because, DuPont alleges, Rhodia 
Fiber breached its oral promise to DuPont that it would 
continue to abide by its obligations in the Agreement, i.e., 
securing loan guarantees for the joint venture. To the 
extent that DuPont presses a claim against Rhodia Fiber for 
breaching its oral commitment to perform under the 
Agreement, DuPont alleges a claim which can well be 
argued (a) embraces the underlying Agreement and (b) 
requires proof that Rhodia Fiber ultimately breached the 
underlying Agreement. The question, then, is whether 
having alleged that it entered into a separate oral 
agreement with Rhodia Fiber binding Rhodia Fiber to the 
very obligations it undertook in the Agreement, DuPont is 
now equitably estopped from avoiding another provision of 
the Agreement, i.e., the arbitration clause. This is a close 
call. 
 
On the one hand, we must be careful about disregarding 
the corporate form and treating a non-signatory like a 
signatory. On the other hand, by alleging, albeit by virtue 
of a separate oral agreement, that Rhodia Fiber failed to 
secure loan guarantees, DuPont's claim against Rhodia 
Fiber implicates, at least in part, the very Agreement which 
DuPont repudiates to avoid arbitration. It is, however, that 
separate oral agreement that saves the day for DuPont 
because, wholly apart from whether Rhodia Fiber breached 
the Agreement, what is at the core of this case is the 
conduct and the statements of appellants' representative in 
January of 1998. 
 
With reference to the second theory of equitable estoppel, 
appellants rely on a series of cases in which signatories 
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were held to arbitrate related claims against parent 
companies who were not signatories to the arbitration 
clause. In each of these cases, a signatory was bound to 
arbitrate claims brought by a non-signatory because of the 
close relationship between the entities involved, as well as 
the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory's 
obligations and duties in the contract and the fact that the 
claims were intertwined with the underlying contractual 
obligations. Thomson-CSF, S.A., 64 F.3d at 779. In essence, 
a non-signatory voluntarily pierces its own veil to arbitrate 
claims against a signatory that are derivative of its 
corporate-subsidiary's claims against the same signatory. 
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 
527 (5th Cir. 2000) (non-signatory able to compel signatory 
to arbitrate claims related to the contract which contained 
an arbitration clause); J.J. Ryan & Sons, 863 F.2d at 320- 
21 (discussed above); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist 
Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(compelling signatory to arbitrate claims against non- 
signatory that were intertwined with claims arising from 
contract governed by arbitration clause); Hughes Masonry 
Co., Inc. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp. , 659 F.2d 
836, 840-41 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); McBro Planning and 
Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Const. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 342, 344 
(11th Cir. 1984) (non-signatory to contract containing 
arbitration clause was bound by signatory to arbitrate 
dispute where claims were inextricably intertwined with 
duties created in underlying contract and non-signatory 
signed a related contract which contained an arbitration 
clause).8 Appellants recognize that these cases bind a 
signatory not a non-signatory to arbitration, but argue that 
this is a distinction without a difference. They are wrong. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See also Dominiun Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 
728 (8th Cir. 2001) (party equitably estopped from arguing that opposing 
parties were not bound by arbitration clause where that same party 
alleged in other lawsuit that those opposing parties were bound by the 
contract containing the arbitration clause.); Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 
309, 
320 (4th Cir. 2001) (compelling signatory to arbitration clause to 
arbitrate claims against non-signatory shareholders where the signatory 
claimed that the non-signatories owed him a duty under the contract 
they did not sign). 
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Indeed, the Second Circuit recently rejected the same 
"distinction without a difference" argument: 
 
       As these cases indicate, the circuits have been willing 
       to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration with a 
       nonsignatory when the issues the nonsignatory is 
       seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with 
       the agreement that the estopped party has signed. As 
       the district court pointed out, however, "[t]he situation 
       here is inverse: E & S, as signatory, seeks to compel 
       Thomson, a non-signatory." While E & S suggests that 
       this is a non-distinction, the nature of arbitration 
       makes it important. Arbitration is strictly a matter of 
       contract; if the parties have not agreed to arbitrate, the 
       courts have no authority to mandate that they do so. 
       In the line of cases discussed above, the courts held 
       that the parties were estopped from avoiding 
       arbitration because they had entered into written 
       arbitration agreements, albeit with the affiliates of 
       those parties asserting the arbitration and not the 
       parties themselves. Thomson, however, cannot be 
       estopped from denying the existence of an arbitration 
       clause to which it is a signatory because no such 
       clause exists. At no point did Thomson indicate a 
       willingness to arbitrate with E & S. Therefore, the 
       district court properly determined these estoppel cases 
       to be inapposite and insufficient justification for 
       binding Thomson to an agreement that it never signed. 
 
Thomson-CSF, S.A., 64 F.3d at 779 (internal citations 
omitted). The distinction between signatories and non- 
signatories is important to ensure that short of piercing the 
corporate veil, a court does not ignore the corporate form of 
a non-signatory based solely on the interrelatedness of the 
claims alleged. The District Court recognized that this was 
so, holding that the corporate form cannot be discarded 
and a non-signatory required to arbitrate unless its 
conduct falls within one of the accepted principles of 
agency or contract law that permit doing so. 
 
In sum, the thrust of the claims in the Amended 
Complaint are far enough removed from the Agreement 
such that DuPont should not be equitably estopped from 
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repudiating the arbitration clause contained in the 
Agreement. 
 
II. Is the Issue of Personal Jurisdiction Now 
Appealable? 
 
DuPont has moved to dismiss appellants' appeal from the 
District Court's concededly interlocutory order denying 
appellants' motion to dismiss for want of personal 
jurisdiction. Appellants ask this Court to exercise its 
discretion in favor of review under the doctrine of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction. We reject appellants' request. 
 
The doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction, in its 
broadest formulation, allows an appellate court in its 
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over issues that are not 
independently appealable but that are intertwined with 
issues over which the appellate court properly and 
independently exercises its jurisdiction. In re TuTu Wells 
Contamination Litigation, 120 F.3d 368, 382 (3d Cir. 
1997)(citing 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and ProcedureS 3937 
at 684-85 (2d ed. 1996). In Swint v. Chambers County 
Commission, the Supreme Court considered the availability 
of pendent appellate jurisdiction and explicitly struck down 
the Eleventh Circuit's liberal construction of 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1291 and 1292 which, the Court said, circumvented the 
limits Congress set on appellate jurisdiction of interlocutory 
orders -- in other words, those orders listed in 1292(a) and 
those certified by a district court under 1292(b). 514 U.S. 
35, 45-47 (1995). 
 
       Congress thus chose to confer on district courts first 
       line discretion to allow interlocutory appeals. If courts 
       of appeals had discretion to append to a Cohen - 
       authorized appeal from a collateral order further 
       rulings of a kind neither independently appealable nor 
       certified by the district court, then the two-tiered 
       arrangement S 1292(b) mandates would be severely 
       undermined. 
 
Id. at 47 (internal footnotes omitted). Despite this rather 
absolute language, the Court did not foreclose entirely the 
availability of pendent appellate jurisdiction: 
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       We need not definitively or preemptively settle here 
       whether or when it may be proper for a court of 
       appeals, with jurisdiction over one ruling, to review, 
       conjunctively, related rulings that are not themselves 
       independently appealable. The parties do not contend 
       that the District Court's decision to deny the Chambers 
       County Commission's summary judgment motion was 
       inextricably intertwined with that court's decision to 
       deny the individual defendants' qualified immunity 
       motions, or that review of the former decision was 
       necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter. 
 
Id. at 50-51 (internal citations omitted). 
 
Building on this guarded endorsement of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction in certain limited circumstances, we 
and other Circuits have recognized "a discretionary, though 
`narrow,' doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction. But we 
have also concluded that the doctrine should be used 
`sparingly,' and only where there is a sufficient overlap in 
the facts relevant to both the appealable and nonappealable 
issues to warrant plenary review. We have also stated that 
`pendent appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise 
unappealable order is available only to the extent necessary 
to ensure meaningful review of an appealable order.' " In re 
Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 375-76 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also In re Tutu 
Wells, 120 F.3d at 382. Essentially, post-Swint, we have 
defined pendent appellate jurisdiction to mirror the 
Supreme Court's two examples: inextricably intertwined 
orders or review of the non-appealable order where it is 
necessary to ensure meaningful review of the appealable 
order. 
 
Although we have not addressed whether we should 
exercise pendent jurisdiction over an appeal of a motion to 
compel arbitration, other Circuits have done so. Where 
personal jurisdiction is inextricably intertwined with the 
immediately appealable decision on a motion to compel 
arbitration or other immediately appealable order, Courts of 
Appeals have exercised pendent jurisdiction over a personal 
jurisdiction issue, but those Courts have been careful to 
explain that the basis of the personal jurisdiction decision 
was identical to the basis of the immediately appealable 
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order. PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank, 
260 F.3d 453, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2001) (consent to arbitrate 
claim in particular forum was also the basis of exercise of 
personal jurisdiction and, thus, the issues were interrelated 
and both reviewed on appeal); Dominium Austin Partners, 
L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 726-27 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(implicitly the same); S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. The Republic of 
Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (exercising 
pendent jurisdiction over personal jurisdiction issue when 
immunity under Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act was 
properly before the court and the two issues were 
"inextricably intertwined"); Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara 
Indonesia, 148 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). 
 
Where, however, personal jurisdiction is not "interrelated" 
or "intertwined" with the merits of the immediately 
appealable order, Courts of Appeals exercise restraint and 
forego review until the unrelated issue is appealable in its 
own right. See, e.g., United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. 
v. Braspetro Oil Services Co., 199 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction over interrelated 
personal jurisdiction issue but refusing to review 
interlocutory forum issue because it has "little or nothing in 
common with" the appealable order); Rein v. Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 759 (2d 
Cir. 1998); see also Associated Business Telephone 
Systems, Corp. v. Greater Capital Corp., 861 F.2d 793, 796 
(3d Cir. 1988) (passing on personal jurisdiction of 
defendant company against whom injunction was granted 
to ensure that injunction was granted against party over 
whom the district court had authority, but refusing to 
review personal jurisdiction of individual defendants who 
were not affected by injunction). The fact that personal 
jurisdiction is or can be case-dispositive does not alter the 
analysis for two reasons. First, denials of motions to 
dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction are not ordinarily 
immediately appealable. Second, as the Second Circuit 
explained: 
 
       It does not follow, however, that a court cannot decide 
       issues of subject matter jurisdiction without at the 
       same time making definitive findings as to personal 
       jurisdiction. For instance, a court could find subject 
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       matter jurisdiction without passing on whether there 
       had been effective service of process, thus leaving the 
       personal jurisdiction question open. The current case 
       presents a different example of the same point. Libya's 
       challenge to personal jurisdiction is based on due 
       process and the principle of minimum contacts. We 
       can readily decide whether the district court had 
       subject matter jurisdiction over Libya without at all 
       considering whether it would violate due process to 
       subject Libya to personal jurisdiction. Because review 
       of the latter is not necessary for review of the former, 
       we conclude that the issues of subject matter 
       jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are not 
       inextricably intertwined in this case. 
 
Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 
748, 759 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 
We undoubtedly have jurisdiction over the District 
Court's refusal to compel arbitration and, as the previous 
section of this opinion indicates, that issue can be 
discussed at length and resolved without any reference to 
whether there was personal jurisdiction over appellants or 
whether the meeting in Delaware attended by their 
representative amounted to "minimum contacts." Indeed, 
for purposes of reviewing and resolving the arbitration 
issue, we were bound to accept as true DuPont's allegation 
that a "Rhodia Group" representative made the 
representations alleged in the Amended Complaint without 
passing on their existence, accuracy or effect. Moreover, the 
"interrelatedness" listed by appellants is far wide of the 
mark -- they cite to the existence and location of DuPont's 
actions, which simply have nothing to do with whether the 
District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over them.9 
The issue of personal jurisdiction does not have to be 
reviewed to exercise meaningful review of the immediately 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The cases cited by appellants do not further their argument. Three of 
those cases were before the respective Courts of Appeals after final 
judgment, and personal jurisdiction was considered first because it was 
a threshold issue. The remaining case -- which, in any event, predated 
Swint -- involved the grant of an injunction. It is well-settled that when 
a court grants an injunction, the underlying personal jurisdiction 
decision is immediately reviewable on appeal. 
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appealable arbitration issue, and we will not exercise 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court insofar as it denied appellants' motion to 
compel arbitration and will dismiss the appeal from the 
denial of appellants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                26 
